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This case study is part of the CEPS project ‘Climate for Sustainable Growth’, whose main objective is to 
analyse the impacts of climate change mitigation measures on the three pillars of sustainable 
development: the economic, environmental and social dimensions.  
It does so by looking at the positive as well as negative, both intended and unintended, impacts of 
climate change mitigation policies and projects. While this case study fully recognizes that policies have 
both positive and negative impacts, the focus of is on (potential) negative impacts of climate change 
mitigation policies.  
The structure of this case study comprises of four sections:  
(1) Sector characteristics,  
(2) Climate-related policies,  
(3) Environmental, social and economic impacts of climate mitigation policies,  
(4) Measures to mitigate impacts of mitigation policies, 
This case study, and the methodology it follows, are not intended to analyse the merit of the policies 
and measures that are being implemented, or their effectiveness and efficiency, but will focus on their 
socio-economic-environmental impacts, and measures to alleviate these impacts in the period of 
transition.  
It is important to note that lack of information and analysis of impacts and tools to mitigate negative 
impacts can act as a brake on ambitious climate action. This case study and the overall project’s focus 
should be seen in this light. 
iii 
Executive Summary  
This case study is part of the project entitled “Climate for Sustainable Growth“ and focuses on the 
energy intensive sector of soda ash. Soda ash is a chemical product used in the production of glass, 
detergents as well as in other chemicals. 
This study examines whether climate change policies that impact the soda ash sector are being put in 
place in a sustainable way, by identifying their impacts on the three dimensions of sustainable 
development: 1) economic 2) social and 3) environmental. This understanding is critical for the speed 
with which mitigation measures can be implemented, for the buy-in they receive from stakeholders 
and for ensuring that they meet the conditions for sustainable development, which implies there is 
progress on all three dimensions in a harmonious way. 
This study looks at the positive as well as negative, both intended and unintended, impacts of climate 
change mitigation policies and projects. Given the broad scope of the topic, this study focusses on 
climate change mitigation policies in the EU, and more specifically the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS).  
After identifying the positive and negative impacts of the EU ETS, domestically and internationally, 
the case study examines the measures put in place to mitigate the (potential) unintended negative 
impacts of climate change mitigation policies.  
It finds that the EU ETS has both positive and negative, both intended and unintended, impacts on 
the three dimensions of sustainable development. It also finds that the impacts at the present time 
are limited and constitute only one of many factors affecting the competitiveness of the European 
soda ash industry. It concludes that there are international impacts that could transmit the cost 
emerging from the carbon price in the EU to other jurisdictions, including developing countries. 
From the economic perspective, as a result of a carbon price, the EU ETS creates three types of costs 
for the soda ash sector: 
A. Direct cost: the cost of buying EU allowances (EUAs) to comply with the EU ETS.  
B. Indirect cost: the EU ETS cost passed through to the soda ash sector in input prices.  
C. Administrative costs: one-off costs for the start-up of the process, and recurring Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV) costs.  
Direct and indirect costs are assessed together in this study, as soda ash plants are often integrated 
with heat and/or power producing installations. These costs are deemed intended as they aim to 
drive low GHG innovation. Administrative costs are considered minor and necessary, to some extent, 
for the functioning of the EU ETS. The administrative costs are estimated at €0.1 per tonne of soda 
ash. 
The total EU ETS cost for a plant depends on its emission intensity of production and the level of EUA 
prices. Low emission-intensive plants currently face EU ETS costs of 0.2% of total production costs, 
high emission-intensive plants face EU ETS costs of 3% of total production cost (EUA prices of €8). 
Note that these EU ETS costs are intended impacts of the EU’s flagship climate change policy. By 
internalizing the costs of GHG emissions, emission reductions are incentivized and revenue from 
auctioned allowances is mobilized. Though this is currently not the case, these revenues could be 
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recycled in order to mitigate the unintended impacts of the EU ETS. These unintended impacts can 
either be found within the EU, or outside of the EU.  
The intended ETS cost have potential unintended consequences. Production cost increases can result 
in a weakened competitive position, which can impact trade flows, investment, production levels and 
employment in the EU and lead potentially to no net emission savings. These impacts are unintended 
impacts of the EU ETS.   
The unintended impacts in the EU mostly result from the inability of installations under the EU ETS to 
fully pass on costs to downstream users and consumers. The production cost increases because of 
direct, indirect and administrative EU ETS costs could lead to installations losing competitive position 
vis-à-vis installations in jurisdictions with less, or no, climate change related constraints. This may 
result in unintended economic impacts (such as reductions in trade, production or investment), 
unintended social impacts (such as loss of employment opportunities) and unintended climate policy 
impacts (such as carbon leakage). Note that carbon leakage will not result in net-GHG emission 
reductions if production or investment is displaced from EU installations to plants based on the 
Solvay or Hou processes outside the EU. 
There are also potential unintended impacts, difficult to quantify, for soda ash users in third 
countries: EU ETS costs could be passed through to them through increases in the price of soda ash 
internationally. This has the potential to impact the cost of glass, and some consumer products, in 
developing countries.  
The unintended impacts of the EU ETS cannot be segregated in current trade, investment and 
production trends, as macroeconomic events, such as the economic and financial crises and energy 
prices, are deemed to have had a far greater impact. 
However, the costs that emerge from the EU ETS have the potential to become substantial for soda 
ash producers, and may also emerge in the chain that includes users of soda ash in jurisdictions 
outside the EU, including developing countries. Three main factors will determine the EU ETS costs 
for the soda ash industry in the future: 1) the choice of fuel to generate heat 2) the evolution of the 
price of EUAs and 3) the continued reduction in freely allocated EUAs, which is the most important 
flanking measure to accompany carbon pricing. 
On the positive side, the EU ETS encourages continued low-GHG innovation, which could be a boon 
to the EU soda ash sector if carbon pricing policies, under similar levels of effort, continue to spread 
globally. 
Secondly, the unintended social impacts of the EU ETS on the soda ash sector have, so far, been 
limited. Emission reductions would improve local air quality and therefore have positive health 
benefits. However, significant production costs increases in the future could lead to unintended plant 
closures. A number of soda ash plants in the EU have closed down in the past decade, but energy 
prices are deemed a far greater factor in these closures than EU ETS costs.  
Thirdly, the EU ETS has had positive environmental impacts by reducing the emissions of GHGs from 
power and industrial sectors. However, the lion’s share of emissions reductions in these sectors since 
the inception of the EU ETS in 2015 is deemed attributable to the overlap with other policies such as 
renewables, as well as to the economic and financial crises. 
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The main unintended negative environmental impact is also an economic impact: the risk of carbon 
leakage. Climate change mitigation policies could cause the displacement of emitting activities to 
countries with no or less stringent climate change policies. If the emissions of those activities 
increase because of this displacement (for example due to the use of less emission-efficient 
technologies), then carbon leakage has taken place. There is currently no proof that production of 
soda ash has moved from the EU to other jurisdictions due to climate change mitigation policies. 
Free allocation has been the main flanking measure put in place by the EU for the industrial sectors 
that are deemed at risk of carbon leakage. Such sectors receive free allowances up to the product 
benchmark, as defined by the least emission-intensive plants in that sector. Free allowances reduce 
the direct costs for industries, limiting the risk of unintended impacts materializing.  
By giving free allowances, the direct cost of the EU ETS is reduced by more than 60% for high 
emission intensive soda ash plants. However, the amount of free allocation is set to diminish yearly, 
with free allocation 18.5 percentage points lower in 2020 than the benchmark. This could decrease 
the effectiveness of free allocation as a measure to mitigate negative impacts. 
While the domestic social impacts of the EU ETS can be addressed through safety nets and flanking 
measures (such as retraining schemes) that exist in the EU member states, there is a lack of 
recognition and management of potential international impacts. The international impacts of the EU 
ETS are currently not the focus of policy makers, and are therefore not identified or measured in a 
systematic manner. Ultimately it is impossible to mitigate the negative impacts of climate-related 
policies if those impacts are not known. 
This case study finds that the EU ETS currently has minor impacts, but that these could increase in 
the near future.  These impacts are not only on emissions (their intended target area), but also in 
other facets of public policy – economic, social and environmental.  
Some of these impacts are also international and reach beyond the jurisdiction implementing them. 
While these international impacts are difficult to quantify, given the level of EU allowance prices, it is 
unlikely that they have had a significant impact at this stage. It is important to note that they are not 
well understood, and therefore not managed.  
Beyond the lessons learned specific to the soda ash case, the analysis here supports the notion that 
any climate change policies should be carefully assessed for their broader sustainable development 
impacts, domestically and internationally, both in their initial elaboration, as well as on an on-going 
basis. 
However, it must be emphasized that this discussion must not be in any way be interpreted or 
construed as encouraging lack of mitigation action. On the contrary, it must be seen as providing a 
way forward that will ensure that action can be undertaken with full support by all stakeholders, 
domestic and international. 
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1. Sector characteristics 
In order to discuss climate change mitigation policies and their impacts on the soda ash sector, it is 
necessary to briefly introduce the sector. This project focuses on climate change mitigation policies 
and the mitigation or management of expected and unexpected negative impacts resulting from 
those policies. This chapter characterises the sector according to the following seven factors:  
• Historical context 
• Downstream sectors 
• Production processes 
• Soda ash globally 
• Soda ash in the EU 
• Production costs 
• Main climate impacts of the sector 
 
1.1 Historical context 
The use of soda ash – the trade name for sodium carbonate (Na2CO3) – dates back to ancient Egypt. 
Primarily used as a soap (hence the ‘soda’ in the name), it was produced until the 19th century by 
burning specific land and water vegetation (hence the ‘ash’). Production processes have, however, 
changed dramatically since then. In the second half of the 19th century the Solvay process was 
developed and became widely adopted. Production of soda ash from trona (a natural mineral) has 
been developing since the Second World War (Thieme, 2012). 
1.2 Downstream sectors 
Soda ash is used in a wide variety of applications and industries. The major consumers of soda ash 
are the glass, detergents and chemicals sectors. In the glass sector it is used for the production of flat 
glass and container glass, where it lowers the melting temperature of the batch, thereby reducing 
energy consumption by 5-10%, while also decreasing NOx emissions (Grahl, 2002). Soda ash makes 
up around 20% of the volume of glass products (Ecofys, 2009a), and accounts for approximately 13% 
of flat glass production costs (Pilkington, 2010). 
In the detergents sector, it is used for the production of washing powders, soaps and scouring 
powders. Additionally it is used as a water softener and to remove grease and alcohol stains. In the 
chemicals sector its main use is as a raw material in the production of sodium-based chemicals such 
as sodium bicarbonate, also known as baking soda (ESAPA, 2015). Figure 1 shows an overview of the 
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global demand for soda ash per sector. The glass sector alone accounts for just over 50% of soda ash 
demand globally. 
Figure 1. Share of downstream demand by usage, 2015 
 
Source: IHS (2015). 
1.3 Production processes  
Three dominant soda ash production processes are used worldwide; the Solvay process, the Hou 
process and trona-based process. Together they account for approximately 93% of all soda ash 
production capacity worldwide. The remaining 7% includes, among others, production from alkaline 
lakes (in Botswana, Kenya and California) and the Akzo dry lime process, which is similar to the Solvay 
process but only used in a very small number of plants (IHS, 2015). 
1.3.1 Solvay process 
This is globally the most widely used production process (45% of global producing capacity). It does 
not use trona as an input, but instead uses cheap and widely available salt brine (both from inland 
and sea-based sources) and limestone. This chemical process recycles ammonia, and only has 
calcium chloride as a major waste product (CEFIC, 2004). 
The Solvay process is mainly used in large (typical production capacity of around 600,000 tonnes 
annually) plants in the EU and China. Its main climate change impacts result from the need for heat in 
the production process. Heat is generated by burning coal, gas or a combination. Between 8.9 and 
12.35 gigajoules (GJ) of energy are necessary per tonne of soda ash (IHS, 2015; Sevas, 2007; ANSAC, 
2010). 
1.3.2 Hou process 
The Hou process is very similar to the Solvay process and is mostly used in smaller coal-fired plants in 
China, which plants have a typical annual production capacity of 210,000 tonnes. It represents 25% of 
global production capacity. The Hou process does not produce calcium chloride as a by-product, but 
rather ammonium chloride (a fertilizer). However, there is currently a global overcapacity of 
ammonium chloride production (IHS, 2015).  
The Hou process is more energy-intensive than the Solvay process, and uses approximately 14.25 GJ 
of energy per tonne of soda ash (ANSAC, 2010).  
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1.3.3 Trona process 
Soda ash produced with the trona process is also known as natural soda ash, as trona is a natural 
deposit. Trona plants often use a combination of gas and coal, and are by far the largest soda ash 
plants with a typical annual production capacity of 2.5 million tonnes. (IHS, 2015). 
The trona process is far less energy-intensive (approximately 5.6 to 7 GJ per tonne of soda ash) and 
emits less GHGs, but is restricted due to the limited number of trona deposits worldwide and the 
purity of the available deposits. It represents 23% of global production capacity. In the US nearly all 
soda ash is trona-based. The world’s largest trona deposit can be found in the Green River Basin, 
Wyoming (Thieme, 2012; CEFIC, 2004; USGS, 2015; IHS, 2015; ANSAC, 2010). 
1.4 Overview of the global market 
There are three major soda ash-producing regions: China, the US and the EU (see Figure 2). Global 
capacity is around 69.5 million tonnes per year. Currently there is a glut in the market: the utilisation 
of global capacity has dropped from approximately 90% in 2007 to just over 80% in 2013. Plants have 
been left idle in both China (operating in 2013 at approximately 80% of capacity) and the EU (2013 
operating rate in 2013 at approximately 75% of capacity) (IHS, 2015). 
Figure 2. Share of global production capacity by region, 2015 
 
Source: IHS, 2015. 
Soda ash is an internationally-traded commodity, with prices set mainly by the purity (or density) of 
the product. 
There are three main exporting regions: the US, EU and China. The latter two mostly produce to 
cover internal demand, and export approximately the same amount. The vast majority of 
international demand, however, is met by cheaper US trona-based soda ash. South-East Asia, South-
Asia and Latin-America are the main importing regions. Africa and Russia are also net-importers of 
soda ash as can be seen in Figure 3. The relative production costs are further assessed in this case 
study. 
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Figure 3. Regions net-exporting (red) and net-importing (green) soda ash (2013 data) 
 
Source: IHS, 2015 
Internationally soda ash is transported by sea and in bulk, and the transportation costs from the main 
exporting regions (US, EU, China) to the main importing regions (Latin America, India, South-East 
Asia, Africa) are comparable.  For example shipping soda ash to India costs between $35 and $45 per 
tonne from either the US, the EU or China (IHS, 2015).  
Overland transportation costs are significant. US production is mostly in Wyoming, from where soda 
ash is transported by train to ports. High US rail costs reduce the cost gap between the US and the 
rest of the world. This mitigates somewhat the cost advantages of trona-based soda ash over inland 
Chinese and EU producers. 
The soda ash sector is dominated by a small group of companies; 10 companies represent 
approximately 45% of global capacity. The three largest companies are Solvay (22% of global capacity 
- with operations in the EU and the US), Tata (12% of global capacity - operations in India, the EU and 
Kenya) and Tronox (9% of global production capacity - operations in the US). The remaining 55% of 
global capacity comes from over 100 smaller firms, mostly based in China (IHS, 2015). 
1.5 The EU soda ash sector 
The soda ash sector in the EU employs approximately 22,500 people and generates sales of around 
€1 billion annually. More than 99% of EU soda ash is produced using the Solvay process. Four 
companies have dedicated soda ash plants, operating 12 plants Solvay process plants in the EU, 
down from 15 plants in 2007. Soda ash is a by-product for the fifth company. The EU has a total 
production capacity of nearly 9.5 million tonnes annually. 
The largest company – Solvay – accounts for over 60% of EU soda ash production capacity. The 
second-largest producer – CIECH – accounts for approximately 25% of the EU’s capacity (IHS, 2015).  
However, as operating rates in the EU have declined (see Figure 4), production has decreased from 
8.7 million tonnes in 2005 to 7.4 million tonnes in 2013.  
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Figure 4. EU production, capacity (in million tonnes) and operating rates (right-hand side), 2005-13 
 
Source: IHS, 2015. 
Over the period 2007-13, imports have increased from 1.5 million tonnes in 2005 to 2.2 million 
tonnes in 2013. In 2013 the EU was still a net exporter of 150,000 tonnes of soda ash (2.33 million 
tonnes were exported and 2.17 million tonnes were imported). However, when we look at EU level 
trade data in terms of value (and not quantity), it becomes clear that there are large fluctuations in 
the soda ash trade balance from year to year. 
Figure 5. Export and import values for trade between EU countries and third countries, 2006-14 (€ mil) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015. 
Imports from the US into the EU have remained stable between 2007 and 2013, while Turkish 
imports have risen steadily from less than 250,000 tonnes in 2007 to more than 800,000 tonnes in 
2014. This situation is set to continue as investments in extra (trona-based) capacity have been 
announced in Turkey (IHS, 2015). Turkey’s annual production capacity is expected to more than 
double over the next three years, from 2.9 million tonnes in 2015 to nearly 6 million tonnes by 2018. 
The EU is currently the only region which has major climate change policies in place for the soda ash 
sector. This is set to change when the Chinese national emissions trading scheme (ETS) is launched; it 
is expected to start in 2017 (Carbon Pulse, 2015a). Chemicals is one of six sectors that will be covered 
by the national ETS, and larger soda-ash plants are likely to reach the threshold for coverage: 
installations emitting more than 26,000 tonnes of CO2e1 are to be covered by the Chinese ETS (ICAP, 
2015b).  
                                                          
1 Since the majority of gases by the EU emissions trading scheme consist of carbon dioxide, all other gases are 
converted into CO2 equivalent units, according to their warming potential, known as CO2e. 
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It is currently unclear which types of emissions (energy and/or process emissions) will be covered by 
the ETS, how high carbon prices are expected to be and which tools to alleviate ETS costs will be put 
in place.   
The climate mitigation policies announced in the US so far, such as the Clean Power Plan, are not 
expected to affect soda ash plants, as the focus of these policies is on power plants (EPA, 2015). 
Turkish climate policies suggested until 2030 in the country’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution are not expected to affect soda ash plants significantly. 
1.6 Production costs 
The production costs for one tonne of soda ash vary across the main producing regions and the 
production process that is used. Production costs of one tonne of soda ash in the US (trona process), 
Western Europe (Solvay process) and China (Solvay and Hou processes) are compared in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Comparison of cash costs per tonne of soda ash across regions (China Solvay = 100, with an indicative 
average world soda ash price) 
 
Notes: Production capacities per plant are added in thousands of tonnes per year. 
Raw materials for the different processes:  
US-trona: trona. West Europe and China Solvay: salt brine, limestone and coke. China Hou: salt, 
ammonia, carbon dioxide.  
Utility usage for the different processes:  
US-trona: coal for electricity and low pressure steam. West Europe and China Solvay: electricity and 
low pressure steam. China Hou: electricity, low pressure steam and cooling water. 
Fixed operating costs for each region:  
Labour, maintenance, overhead, and taxes and insurance. The latter three are estimated as a function 
of plant size and total fixed investment (TFI). 
Sales and Admin is a fixed percentage of TFI for each region. US and EU: 0.6% and 0.9% for China 
Royalties (US only) is the royalty paid to the US Bureau of Land Management, fixed at 6% of selling 
price. 
Source: IHS (2015). 
One can draw three main findings from Figure 6: 
1) US trona-process soda ash has far lower production costs compared to Solvay and Hou soda 
ash. US trona-process soda ash raw material costs and utility bills per tonne are significantly 
lower than the EU-Solvay and China-Solvay costs. China-Hou raw materials and utility costs 
are the highest of all production processes. These differences are caused by two raw 
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materials-related factors: a) trona prices are considerably lower than limestone and salt 
brine prices and b) ammonia consumed in the Hou process is relatively expensive.  
2) Solvay-process soda ash in China and the EU have similar total production costs, even though 
there are large differences between these two regions in the make-up of those production 
costs. First, utility costs (steam and electricity) are significantly higher in the EU than in China, 
and second the price of salt is more than three times as high in China.  
These two factors cancel out part of the production costs differences between Solvay-
process soda ash in the EU and China. 
3) Hou-process soda ash is significantly more costly to produce. The ammonia consumed in the 
Hou-process accounts for 75% of the raw materials cost. In the Solvay process, ammonia is 
continuously recycled, which means that Solvay-process soda ash does not entail this 
considerable cost. 
As mentioned above, however, the Hou process also has a by-product: the fertilizer 
ammonium chloride. The sale of this co-product needs to be taken into account when 
analysing the different production cost structures. While Figure 6 shows that Hou-process 
soda ash is far more expensive to produce, Figure 7 shows that a part of that difference is 
mitigated by the sale of ammonium chloride. 
At the present time, however, the sales price of ammonium chloride is historically low2 (IHS, 
2015). The sales price of ammonium chloride used in Figure 7 is an indicator of the average 
price throughout 2014 (approximately 70 USD per tonne). However, the price started 
recovering in the summer of 2015, if this trend continues Hou-process soda ash will become 
more competitive versus Solvay-process soda ash.  
Figure 7. Comparison of cash cost per tonne of soda ash across regions, including the current sales price of 
ammonium chloride (China Solvay = 100, with an indicative average world soda ash price) 
 
Source: IHS (2015). 
                                                          
2 In the spring of 2015 it dropped to around $50 per tonne, down from more than $180 per tonne at the end of 
2013. 
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1.7 Climate change impacts of soda ash production 
The environmental impacts of soda ash production depend on two factors: the production process 
and fuel used, as shown in Figure 8. Soda ash production using the Solvay or Hou process requires 
significant energy in the form of heat or steam. The production of this steam is the main determinant 
for explaining the differences in GHG emissions between plants within the same process.  
Trona-process soda ash consumes less energy and emits less GHGs. As can be expected, coal-fired 
Solvay plants emit significantly more GHGs per tonne of product than gas-fired plants. However, 
current low prices of coal and high EU gas prices have led to coal-fired soda ash being more 
competitive. Two recently closed soda ash plants were gas-fired. 
Figure 8. Energy consumption (left-hand axis, bar) and GHG emissions (right-hand axis, line), 
by production process and region 
 
Source: Ansac (2010). 
 
Figure 8, however, does not show the full picture; some trona mines emit methane. Mining 
emissions narrow the gap with the Solvay process in terms of emissions intensity.  
Total emissions from the EU soda ash sector equalled approximately 10 million tonnes of carbon 
equivalent emissions (CO2e) in 2009. Emissions intensity data per EU plant were compiled by Ecofys 
and updated after a review of the scope of the emissions taken into account for that study (Ecofys, 
2009b). These updated numbers are currently still confidential.  
The main findings of the Ecofys study are as follows: 
- The most emissions-intensive plant in the EU emitted more than 2 tonnes of CO2e per tonne 
of soda ash, and is an outlier. Other emissions-intensive plants emit between 1.3 and 1.4 
tonnes of CO2e per tonne of soda ash. 
- The least emissions-intensive plant emitted about 0.7 tonnes of CO2e per tonne of soda ash. 
The average emissions intensity was 1.05 tonnes of CO2e per tonne of soda ash. 
- The differences in emission intensity are largely due to the fuel used, with coal-fired plants 
emitting more than gas-fired plants. 
The best performers emit 30% less than the sector average and are gas-fired plants. The worst 
performers (not counting the outlier) emit up to 40% more than the sector average, and are coal-
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fired. The remaining plants are spread out between the best and worst performers, and use a 
combination of gas and coal (Ecofys, 2009b). 
1.8 Conclusion 
Soda ash is an important commodity that is internationally traded. It is mainly produced in three 
regions with significant exports to South-East Asia, South-Asia, Latin-America, Africa and the Middle 
East.  
The EU and China produce mostly for their domestic market. The US is the main exporting region 
because trona-based soda ash is less energy and emissions-intensive and has a competitive 
advantage due to lower production costs. US trona-process soda ash is by far the cheapest to 
produce, and its producers can use this competitive advantage: it can be considered the baseload 
global supplier of soda ash.  
However, global deposits of trona are limited and insufficient to supply the world market for soda 
ash. Currently 23% of global capacity is trona-based. Therefore the more energy- and emissions-
intensive Solvay and Hou-based soda ash are necessary to meet total demand. 
Countries that do not have significant soda ash production capacities (mostly developing countries in 
Latin America and South Asia), and that are not supplied by the US, import soda ash from the EU and 
China. EU Solvay and China Solvay are at a similarly competitive position, and although the Hou 
process is currently at a competitive disadvantage, it could regain a more favourable position as the 
price of ammonium chloride recovers. Currently both regions have an overcapacity of soda ash 
production.  
This competitive balance, however, could be distorted by asymmetrical climate-change mitigation 
policies. If climate-change mitigation policies cause additional costs for soda ash producers in one 
region, but not in other regions, this causes a change in competitive balances. While China is 
planning on launching its national ETS in 2017, at the moment climate change policies are still 
asymmetric between the EU and China. 
While these two regions are characterised by comparable production costs, one of the factors 
affecting their relative competitiveness is asymmetrical climate change mitigation policies. While the 
EU has placed a price on GHG emissions for soda ash producers, this is currently not yet the case for 
all Chinese producers.3 
However, this asymmetry in coverage of GHG pricing mechanisms could change in the coming years; 
the Chinese national ETS is planned to be launched by 2017. Carbon-intensive chemical installations, 
such as soda ash plants, are planned to be included (ICAP, 2015b), although it remains to be seen if 
the GHG reduction efforts, carbon prices and cost mitigation measures will be comparable between 
regions. This depends on the implementation details, and therefore, the impacts of the Chinese 
national ETS. These details are currently not publically available to the general public.  
  
                                                          
3 Currently soda ash plants are covered by two of the Chinese pilot emissions-trading schemes: Shanghai and 
Tianjin (Carbon Pulse, 2015a). Assessing the cost impact of these pilots, however, is challenging and falls 
outside the scope of this case study. 
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2. Climate change mitigation policies 
This section chapter analyses various climate change mitigation policies from the three main soda 
ash-producing regions. Globally the number of direct and indirect climate change policies impacting 
the soda ash sector is limited.  
The case study focuses on EU policies and especially the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). The 
main reasons for focusing on the EU and the EU ETS include: 
1. Information on policies and impacts is available,  
2. It is a major soda ash-producing region and 
3. The EU ETS is the flagship climate change policy. 
The overviews of climate change mitigation policies in the United States and China presented are not 
exhaustive overviews of all climate change mitigation policies in those countries, but should more be 
seen as a superficial but indicative analysis of climate change mitigation policies that impact the soda 
ash sector in those countries. 
2.1 United States 
2.1.1 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permitting program 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains a PSD permitting program. Plants need a 
permit to emit certain types of gases, including GHGs. Therefore it is a direct climate change policy. 
Plants only receive a PSD permit if they meet certain emissions limits determined by sectoral Best 
Available Control technologies of emissions (EPA, 1983).  
However, the permits are grandfathered to existing plants: as long as they are not modified 
significantly, they continue to be licensed (EPA, 2011 and Mangino, 2010). This causes a perverse 
incentive: companies that wish to upgrade their plant need to apply for a new permit. This 
encourages continuation of the status quo and discourages GHG-reducing investments. Only 
investments that repay the costs of compliance for a new PSD permit, such as energy efficiency 
projects, will be undertaken. 
2.2 China 
2.2.1 Chinese National and Pilot ETS 
Details on the Chinese national ETS planned for 2017 remain scarce. However the Chinese 
government has announced that emissions-intensive installations in the chemicals sector, such as 
soda plants, are to be covered by the emissions trading scheme (ICAP, 2015a). However it is currently 
unclear which types of emissions will be included: emissions related to energy production and/or 
process emissions (Carbon Pulse, 2015a).  
Soda ash plants are currently covered by two pilots: Tianjin and Shanghai (ICAP, 2015c). The 
Guangdong pilot is set to expand into the chemical industry in 2015 or 2016, but it remains to be 
announced whether soda ash plants will also be included (Carbon Pulse, 2015b). 
However, due to the scarcity of information on the implementation of the pilots and available data, 
Chinese climate change policies are not further taken into account in this case study. 
2.3 European Union 
As mentioned above, the EU and its climate change policies are the focus of this case study. Three 
climate change policies are examined: the industrial emissions Directive, the renewable energy 
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Directive and the EU ETS. The main focus of this case study is on the EU’s flagship climate change 
mitigation policy: the EU ETS. This policy is therefore analysed more in depth, while the industrial 
emissions Directive and the renewable energy Directive are not considered in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.3.1 Industrial Emissions Directive 
The industrial emissions Directive (IED) is the successor of the integrated pollution prevention and 
control (IPPC) Directive and deals with pollution from various industrial sources, including emissions 
to air, water and land, generation of waste, use of raw materials and restoration of the site upon 
closure (European Commission, 2010b). Operators of industrial installations are required to hold an 
integrated permit issued by national authorities. More than 50,000 installations are covered by the 
Directive.  
It is not a direct climate change policy as GHGs do not fall under the Directive; this would cause an 
overlap between the IED and the EU ETS. It does impact GHG emissions indirectly: one of the main 
strategies to comply with IED emissions standards is through revamping industrial boilers and ovens. 
This allows more efficient burning and reduces a wide variety of emissions including GHG emissions. 
However, this policy is not discussed further in this case study because the impacts of the IED cannot 
be clearly allocated to climate-change mitigation objectives. 
2.3.2 Renewable Energy Directive 
The renewable energy Directive establishes a policy for the production and promotion of energy from 
renewable sources in the EU. The EU-wide objective is to fulfil at least 20% of total EU energy needs 
with renewables by 2020. This target is split between individual national targets, ranging from 10% 
(Malta) to 49% (Sweden). Each EU member state also has the obligation to reach a 10% share of 
renewables in transport (through biofuels). 
The renewable energy targets can have significant impacts on energy prices, depending on how each 
member state chooses to reach those targets. For example, feed-in tariffs increase the price of 
electricity by guaranteeing these projects a price (or tariff) for the electricity they produce. This tariff 
is typically higher than wholesale electricity prices. Its impacts on the soda ash sector are also 
indirect, as soda ash plants are typically not electricity consumers, but some produce electricity as a 
by-product of steam generation. The renewable support measures can therefore be considered as 
subsidies for their competitors. 
2.3.3 EU ETS 
The EU ETS is the flagship EU climate change policy. This policy is discussed more in detail in this 
chapter and in the following chapters, which address the impacts of climate change policies and the 
mitigation of those impacts. 
A. Overview  
The EU ETS Directive (European Commission, 2003) established a cap-and-trade system in 2005 as a 
cost-effective tool to reach the GHG targets to which the EU had committed itself. It is the EUs 
flagship climate change policy. The EU ETS was expanded to the non-EU members of the European 
Economic Area – Lichtenstein, Norway and Iceland – in 2007.  
The EU ETS compliance is managed at the installation level. More than 11,000 installations in the 
manufacturing and power-generation sector and aviation within the borders of the EU and EEA are 
covered by the scheme. Although the emissions of several gases are covered by the scheme, the 
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large majority is carbon dioxide (CO2), and therefore all gases are converted into CO2 equivalent 
units, according to their warming potential (known as CO2e). 
Each year, each installation must surrender a number of emissions permits equal to its carbon 
emissions during the past year. European Union Allowances (EUAs) and other international, units are 
compliance units and represent one tonne of CO2e emissions. This policy thereby seeks to extend the 
polluter-pays principle to GHG emissions.  
The total cap for emissions is equal to the total amount of EUAs made available each year through 
free allocation or auctioning. Beneath that cap, market participants, including covered installations, 
are free to trade. This is meant to maintain the cost-effectiveness of emissions-reductions by 
ensuring that the cheapest reductions will be undertaken first. The total cap of the EU ETS is set to 
decrease every year by a linear reduction factor of 1.74%. 
B. Key Provisions  
The EU ETS is based on the principle that operators of industrial and power installations covered by 
the EU ETS Directive surrender allowances to cover their emissions. The major characteristic of the 
functioning of the ETS in the third – current – phase is an increase in auctioning of allowances – more 
than 40% of all allowances will be auctioned (including full auctioning for the power sector). Energy-
intensive industries, however, continue to receive a large part of the allowances they have to 
surrender for free, and will have to buy any shortfall at auctions or in the market.  
The allocation to emissions-intensive industries is largely determined by using benchmarks, 
established per product, according to the Benchmarking Decision (European Commission, 2011). In 
general, the average carbon-intensity of the 10% best performers represents the benchmark for 
allocating free emissions. Each installation producing the same product has the same benchmark and 
receives the same amount of free allocation per produced unit. Installations that are more emissions-
intensive than the benchmark thus receive a smaller percentage of free allowances relative to their 
total emissions than less emissions-intensive installations. The former are thereby encouraged to 
catch up to their best-performing peers. This approach also rewards early action by industry towards 
reducing emissions.  
The benchmarks are determined as the number of allowances received per tonne of production at 
the installation. However the level of production at an installation is based on historical levels: the 
median production during the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2008, or, where it is 
higher, on the median production during the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010. 
Changes in production are currently not taken into account, unless production is scaled back to less 
than 50% of the historical level. Production increases beyond historical levels (and thus emissions 
increases) also fall outside the scope of the benchmark and therefore are not taken into account 
during free allocation of allowances. 
Free allocation for all manufacturing industries under the cap is granted at the 80% level of the 
benchmark in 2020, a share that is set to decrease to 30% in 2020 for sectors not deemed exposed to 
the risk of carbon leakage. Sectors that are deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage, and which are 
listed in the Carbon Leakage List (European Commission, 2009c and European Commission, 2014), 
receive free allowances up to 100% of their benchmarks. The list was thoroughly revised in 2014. 
Free allocation is done according to the following formula: 
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Allocation = benchmark x historical activity level x carbon leakage exposure factor  
x cross-sectoral correction factor 
Where the historical activity level (or production) is installation-specific, and the carbon leakage 
factor is 100% for the soda ash sector. The cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) guarantees that the 
sum of the free allocation proposed by each member state does not exceed the EU ETS-wide cap on 
free allocation. The CSCF determines the proportion of the proposed free allocation that is granted to 
each installation that is eligible to receive allocation and will decrease yearly to circa 82.44% in 2020. 
C. Relevance for the soda ash sector 
The soda ash sector is considered one sector together with sodium bicarbonate production since it 
entered the EU ETS in Phase 3 (2013). The soda ash sector is on the Carbon Leakage List. 
The benchmark, which was determined in 2009 on the basis of 2005 emissions, was set at 0.843 
tonnes of CO2 per tonne of soda ash. In practical terms, this means that soda ash plants receive 0.843 
allowances per tonne of soda ash they produce, at the level of their historical level of production 
(Ecofys, 2009b). In the longer term this will decrease as the cross-sectoral correction factor decreases 
up to 2020. 
It is likely that plants currently receive more than 0.843 allowances per tonne of soda ash produced. 
Operating rates have decreased significantly since the base years for the determination of the 
benchmarks (2005-10). As long as at least 50% of historical production is maintained, allocation is not 
flexibly adjustable to changes in production levels. Capacity expansions, however, are taken into 
account during the allocation of free allowances. 
3. Impacts of climate change mitigation policies 
This chapter analyses the economic, social and environmental impacts of climate change policies on 
the soda ash sector. Quantifying these impacts is a challenging task due to: 
a) the difficulties linked to gathering sensitive company and plant-level data in a competitive 
sector and 
b) the scarcity of data identifying and measuring impacts, including the follow-up response to 
impact assessments.  
This case study does not aim to assess the efficiency and efficacy of climate change policy in terms of 
GHG reductions, but rather it intends to examine the management of the impacts of those policies. 
We have observed positive and negative impacts, which can be intended or unintended. All impacts 
of climate change policies are important, but it is clearly the negative unintended impacts that need 
management. Management of the impacts of long-term mitigation policies is necessary in the short 
term in order to enable a smooth transition to a low-GHG economy.  
3.1 Economic impacts of the EU ETS 
3.1.1 Positive economic impacts 
The main positive economic impact of the EU ETS for the soda ash sector is that it increases 
incentives for continued low-GHG innovation. This could lead to an improved competitive position as 
carbon-pricing policies spread globally in the longer term. The experience that EU soda ash producers 
acquire in decreasing emissions intensity of production could leave them with a competitive 
advantage against global competitors using the Solvay and Hou processes. The latter will have to 
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catch up with implementing low-GHG production technologies. The energy and emissions advantages 
of trona-based soda ash are significant and will remain so in the medium to longer term.  
3.1.2 Negative economic impacts 
This section identifies and assesses potentially negative economic impacts of energy sector policies 
on the soda ash sector. These could take the form of possible additional costs, trade distortions, 
reduced investments or adverse implications for the global economy. These elements are discussed 
in detail below. 
1. Additional costs 
The additional costs caused by the EU ETS that can worsen the current competitive position of EU 
soda-ash producers take the following forms: 
 Direct costs: These entail the cost of buying EUAs for compliance, which are either freely 
allocated or bought on the secondary market.  This is currently negative for some plants, 
however, as soda-ash plants have been oversupplied the previous two years. This situation 
could change in the medium term, however. The direct cost is an intended impact for soda 
ash producers. 
 Indirect costs: The compliance cost of sectors that produce inputs for the soda-ash sector are 
passed through. Indirect costs passed through from steam-producing facilities are the most 
relevant for the soda ash sector – and the most significant. These facilities are generally short 
and have to buy EUAs on the secondary market. Indirect costs is an intended impact for soda 
ash producers. 
 Administrative costs: Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) obligations create costs 
that increase production costs. These costs are deemed intended to some extent, as by 
enabling the collection of data and the compliance of installations they are necessary for the 
functioning of the ETS. Administrative costs are of course to be kept to an absolute minimum 
for both the installations under the EU ETS as the ETS’s governing bodies. 
 
A. Direct costs 
At the end of each year, installations surrender EUAs to match their CO2 emissions in that year (in 
tonnes). Essentially, the cost of compliance is the difference between the amount of EUAs each 
installation needs to surrender and the number of free allowances allocated, multiplied by the price 
of allowances purchased (Renda et al., 2013a and 2013b).Installations producing soda ash receive 
free allowances, as they are considered at risk of carbon leakage. These free allowances are further 
discussed under the next chapter on mitigation of impacts. Any shortage of allowances can be 
purchased from auctions or on the secondary market.  
Note that direct costs are an intended impact of the EU ETS, as they aim to internalize GHG emission 
costs into production processes and thereby incentivizing low GHG production. 
Using historically verified emissions and CO2 prices, it is possible to estimate direct costs for the EU 
soda-ash sector. In this approach the following formula is used: 
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𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜)
=  𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2) 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2) 
Where: 
- Verified emissions are emissions reported for each EU soda ash installation in the EU 
Transaction Log: the data platform where emissions and allowances per installation are 
made public by the European Commission (2015b) 
- Carbon price is the historical yearly average EUA price 
o 2013-14: yearly averages of the daily settlement prices for Dec Future contracts 
for delivery in that year. The daily settlement prices were reported by the 
European Energy Exchange (2015), a prominent platform for the trade in EUAs 
 
Note that the EUA price used is a proxy and is likely to produce imperfect results. A 
plant-by-plant analysis of transfers and trading strategies to see who sold what, when 
and at which price is necessary to fully understand carbon prices and the exact impact of 
the EU ETS.  
This approach does not take indirect costs into account, and is therefore not an accurate description 
of the real costs faced by EU soda ash producers. In reality most plants are integrated with their heat 
suppliers, however, plants are administratively split up into sections in the EU ETS registry, with each 
part – or installation – defined by its main purpose. Therefore soda-ash plants can be split into a 
soda-ash installation and a steam-generating installation on paper, even though these two 
installations are regarded by the company operating them as one single plant.  
On the level of installations identified in the EU TL as soda-ash producing installations, all but two 
were oversupplied to various degrees in the 2013-2014 period. Total oversupply was 4.8 million EUAs 
(European Commission, 2015b). The emissions reported in the EU Transaction Log (EU TL) are 
however significantly lower than the sector averages as reported in the benchmarking study (Ecofys, 
2009b): 0.6 versus 1.05 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of soda ash. This means that a significant source of 
emissions is not covered by this approach, and neither are the costs associated with it: the indirect 
costs.  
B. Indirect costs 
Plants producing and selling electricity or heat face increased production costs through their ETS 
compliance costs. They pass on these costs to their respective customers via higher energy rates. 
Industrial electricity and heat consumers therefore face an extra cost because of the cost of CO2 
embedded in electricity and heat prices. This is an additional cost, which they may not be able to 
pass on fully to the ultimate consumers if they are active in a globally competitive sector. Indirect 
costs should be considered an intended impact of the EU ETS, as they aim to internalizing upstream 
GHG emissions costs into production processes, thereby incentivizing the sourcing of low-GHG 
intensive intermediate goods, raw materials and energy. 
Note that indirect costs have been passed through to soda-ash installations since the inception of the 
EU ETS in 2005 as power plants and large combustion installations were covered from the start.  
While soda ash is not an electricity-intensive sector, a number of installations do obtain heat from 
external sources, often combined heat and power (CHP) plants. Note that the word ‘external’ refers 
to the way the EU ETS is structured.  
 16 
The pass-on rate of the CO2 cost for producing electricity and heat is a number that is contested and 
may vary significantly between member states. In this case study, the pass-on rate is assumed to be 
one, but this is a conservative assumption and may overestimate actual indirect costs.  
The main difficulty for calculating precise indirect costs is that individual soda-ash installations have 
various different relationships with their providers of steam and electricity. As mentioned they might 
only be two installations on paper but be operationally one plant. On the other hand, several soda-
ash producers have arrangements with the facilities that provide heat, such as long-term contracts or 
investment agreements.  
Additionally a number of heat-producing installations linked to soda ash installations are Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP) installations. These CHP installations produce heat for one or more 
installations (such as the soda ash installations in question) and co-produce power that is sold to the 
grid. This further muddles the picture on indirect costs as the pass-through of EU ETS costs to either 
the consumers of heat or power is sensitive and confidential company-level information. 
Due to the lack of plant-specific data on steam and electricity consumed per tonne of soda ash 
produced, it is challenging to accurately calculate indirect EU ETS costs for soda-ash installations. 
While it has been possible to map out soda-ash installations and heat- and/or power-producing 
installations linked to them, it has proven impossible to independently verify what share, if any, of 
EUA costs has been passed on to the soda-ash installations.  
It is clear, however, that these heat- and/or power-producing installations faced EUA shortages. 
While they emitted just under 41 million tonnes of CO2 since the start of Phase 2 until the start of 
2015, during that same period these installations received a total of approximately 34.5 million EUAs. 
This means that they were nearly 6.5 million allowances short. Although it is impossible to estimate 
precisely what percentage of this shortfall in EUAs was passed on to soda-ash producers without 
access to contracts between heat providers and soda-ash installations, it is safe to assume that a 
significant part of it was passed through. An estimation of expected costs can be found below under 
Total additional costs. 
C. Administrative costs 
Two kinds of administrative costs arise under the EU ETS: one-off costs for the start-up of the 
process, and recurring Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) costs. The start-up costs are 
caused by the investments necessary for monitoring compliance. For illustrative purposes, the 
infrastructure needed for the correct measuring of emissions would represent a one-off start-up cost 
(European Commission, 2012). MRV costs are the additional burdens placed on installations for 
continued compliance with monitoring duties, for example the wages of the staff dealing with the 
administrative aspects, or the cost of hiring a verifier to check emissions measurements. 
Data on administrative costs are challenging to compile, as they are determined by sensitive plant-
specific data. However, CEPS has in the past conducted in-depth studies on EU ETS costs, which 
included administrative costs. Industrial installations in the steel sector, the aluminium sector and 
downstream aluminium sector faced administrative costs between €0.02 and €0.93 per tonne of 
product. However, the administrative costs for larger plants, such as steel plants, are between €0.10 
and €0.13 per tonne of product.  
We assume that administrative costs for soda-ash plants are on the same order of magnitude: 
approximately €0.10 per tonne.  
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D. Total EU ETS costs 
In order to estimate the total additional EU ETS costs, the average the amount of CO2 that is on 
emitted during production of one tonne of soda ash is multiplied by the estimated costs of emission. 
Administrative costs are then added. This approach therefore takes direct, indirect and 
administrative costs into account. In this case total additional costs are equal to: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ
)
= [𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (
𝐶𝑂2
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ
)
− 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 (
𝐶𝑂2
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ
)] 
𝑥 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2
 ) 
+ 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
Where: 
- Carbon intensity of production is an sector average. 
- Soda ash benchmark is the number of allowances per tonne of historical production that 
each soda ash plant receives. For Phase 3 it is set at 0.843 EUAs per tonne of soda ash. 
- Carbon price is a fixed and exogenous price of emissions allowances. 
- Administrative costs are estimated at €0.1 per tonne of soda ash. 
This approach allows us to look at potential impacts of any carbon-pricing mechanism, using carbon 
prices that are deemed plausible in the longer term. It is, however, a simplification of how the EU ETS 
functions. 
Theoretical carbon costs for three different types of soda ash plants and two EUA prices are 
estimated in Table 1 below. Two EUA prices are chosen: an approximation of the current EUA price 
(€8) and the EUA price used by the European Commission for assessing the longer-term impacts of 
the EU ETS (€30) (European Commission, 2014a). 
The technical – installation level – details of the EU ETS and potential future reductions in carbon 
intensity of soda ash production are however not taken into account. Table 1 is therefore not an 
accurate estimation of the historical and future economic impacts of the EU ETS on soda ash plants.   
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Table 1. Total additional costs per tonne of soda ash produced (direct, indirect and administrative costs) for 
plants with different emissions intensities, for two EUA prices, with estimated percentages of current cash costs 
(approx. €150 per tonne of soda ash) and free allocation at benchmark level. 
Notes: The Ecofys (2009b) benchmarking study determined the emissions intensity of European soda-ash 
plants. The emissions intensities chosen for this table are sourced from that study, with two major differences:  
1) The emissions intensities in the study were reconsidered by the European Commission and subsequently 
raised. This has been taken into account here. 
2) The most emissions-intensive plant in the benchmarking study is considered an outlier and is not taken into 
account here. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
As expected, the impact of the EU ETS on soda-ash plants depends on both the carbon intensity of 
production and the price of EU allowances. The least emissions-intensive plants in the EU emit 
approximately 0.8 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of soda ash. Because their carbon intensity is lower than 
the benchmark, they receive more allowances than necessary to cover their emissions. The EU ETS 
therefore has a positive impact on the plant’s costs.  
The picture is very different for the most-emissions-intensive installations in the EU (carbon intensity 
of production of 1.4 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of soda ash). These installations emit 50% more than 
the benchmark, and therefore have to buy additional EUAs. Direct costs in the longer term could run 
up to €16.71 per tonne of soda ash for these GHG-intensive plants, or 11% of the current production 
cost of soda ash. Direct costs are linearly dependent on the carbon intensity and the EUA price in this 
approach, and therefore plants that emit a relatively higher amount of GHG also face an equivalently 
higher carbon cost.  
Note that this theoretical carbon cost is a simplification, and does not take three important factors 
into account: 
1) Historical production levels. This currently works to the advantage of soda-ash plants, but if 
demand picks up sufficiently to push production beyond the historical levels used in the 
benchmarking exercise, this will work against the sector. 
2) The pass through of EU ETS costs. Many EU plants produce heat (necessary for the Solvay 
process) and electricity as a by-product. This electricity is sold to third parties, and EU ETS costs 
could be passed in electricity prices.  
3) Cross-sectoral correction factor. This will reduce the amount of free allocation yearly up to 
2020.  
Carbon price Carbon cost for low-
emissions-intensive 
plant (0.8 tonne of CO2 
per tonne of soda ash) 
Carbon cost for 
medium emissions-
intensive plant (1.15 
tonnes of CO2 per 
tonne of soda ash) 
Carbon cost for high 
emissions-intensive plant 
(1.4 tonnes of CO2 per 
tonne of soda ash) 
€8 per EUA 
(or 1 tonne of CO2) 
€-0.24 
Approx. 0.2% of 
production costs 
€2.56 
Approx. 2% of 
production costs 
€4.56 
Approx. 3% of 
production costs  
€30 per EUA 
(or 1 tonne of CO2) 
€-1.19 
Approx. 1% of 
production costs 
€9.31 
Approx. 6% of 
production costs 
€16.81 
Approx. 11% of 
production costs 
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E. Conclusion on EU ETS costs 
Currently there is no clear evidence that the EU ETS has caused additional costs nor gains for the 
soda ash sector in general. At the sector level, soda ash was oversupplied and accumulated a total of 
4.8 million allowances. On the plant level, two installations did not receive sufficient EUAs to cover 
their emissions. Installations supplying heat and/or power to soda ash installations had a shortfall of 
6.4 million allowances, and will have passed a share of the cost of buying EUAs through to the soda 
ash installations.  
How large that share is requires additional research and falls outside the scope of this case study, it is 
however deemed to be significant due to the relationships between soda ash plants and their heat 
suppliers, and the way the EU ETS registry separates the two types of installations. 
The administrative burden of complying with the EU ETS also caused a minor cost for soda-ash 
producers. 
But is the past a good representation of the future? The EU ETS is still relatively young, and soda ash 
has only come under its governance in the last two years. These two years were characterised by 
both low EUA prices and low sector-wide operating rates.  
Free allocation is made on the basis of historical production levels in the benchmark years (2005 and 
2006), when operating rates were over 90% in Western Europe, they have since fallen to just over 
70% in 2013. Once operating rates pick up and approach or even surpass the 2005-06 levels, direct 
costs for the sector will also pick up. 
Additionally, free allocation will continue to reduce annually due to the cross-sectoral correction 
factor. By 2020, it will reduce free allocation by nearly 20% under the benchmark. It is safe to assume 
that if the sector is not yet short, it will be by 2020.  
The estimation of the theoretical or average marginal carbon cost shows that at 100% operating 
rates, and different levels of EUA prices, direct costs could become very significant for medium and 
high carbon-intensive plants, running up to 11% of current production costs for the most emissions-
intensive plants and the highest EUA price used in the estimation. At the same time, low-emissions 
plants will continue to receive more allowances than necessary for compliance. 
As is made clear above, direct costs are linearly related to the emissions intensity of the plant. 
Because the main source of GHG emissions in soda ash plants is caused by the choice of fuel (coal or 
gas), it is possible to mitigate the EU ETS direct costs by switching from coal to gas. However, gas 
prices are currently far higher than coal prices in the EU, whereas this difference is markedly smaller 
in other regions. One tonne of Solvay-process soda ash needs 11.5 gigajoules (GJ) of energy input 
(ANSAC, 2010).  
The price of natural gas in the EU is currently approximately €7.4 per GJ, while the price of coal 
stands at €2.7 per GJ (GDF-Suez, 2015). This means that switching from coal to gas increases energy 
bills by €54.05, or approximately one-third of production costs.  
If this difference in energy prices persists, operators of soda ash plants will face a choice: either 
continue to use coal and pay the direct EU ETS costs, or switch to gas and pay the additional energy 
cost. Either way, EU producers of soda ash face a cost that non-EU producers do not face. In a highly 
competitive international market for the commodity, this means they will either lose market share or 
have to reduce margins. 
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Note that these EU ETS costs are intended impacts of the EU’s flagship climate change policy. By 
internalizing the costs of GHG emissions, emission reductions are incentivized and revenue from 
auctioned allowances is mobilized. Though this is currently not the case, these revenues could be 
recycled in order to mitigate the unintended impacts of the EU ETS. These unintended impacts can 
either be found within the EU, or outside of the EU.  
The unintended impacts in the EU mostly result from the inability of installations under the EU ETS to 
fully pass on costs to downstream users and consumers. The production cost increases because of 
direct, indirect and administrative EU ETS costs could lead to installations losing competitive position 
vis-à-vis installations in jurisdictions with less, or no, climate change related constraints. This may 
result in unintended economic impacts (such as reductions in trade, production or investment), 
unintended social impacts (such as loss of employment opportunities) and unintended climate  policy 
impacts (such as carbon leakage).  
Unintended impacts outside the EU results from the ability of installations to partially pass on EU ETS 
costs to downstream users and consumers outside the EU. Soda ash consumers in third countries, 
including developing countries, could face increased soda ash prices, which may be passed on to 
wider society in the prices of goods. 
These unintended impacts are discussed in depth below. 
2. Trade 
The analysis of the direct, indirect and administrative costs has not provided a clear picture that the 
EU ETS has caused significant costs for the soda ash sector. Recent import and export data also do 
not reveal a clear indication that the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005 and the inclusion of the soda 
ash sector in 2013 caused unintended and significant trade distortions, as Figure 9 shows. 
Figure 9. Exports and imports of soda ash in the EU, 2004-13 (000s of tonnes) 
Source: IHS (2015). 
It is likely that the relatively large year-on-year differences are caused by macroeconomic 
developments such as the economic and financial crises. However, it must be noted that in 2013 – 
the only year in Figure 8 during which soda ash was covered by the EU ETS – the EU’s net exports did 
fall notably compared to the year before. However, this cannot be fully attributed to the EU ETS as 
direct and indirect costs in that year were not found to be significantly high. To conclude, as yet there 
is no clear indication that the EU ETS has impacted the EU’s trade balance for the soda ash sector. 
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Figure 10 shows that the decrease in soda ash production predates the inclusion of the soda ash 
sector in the EU ETS. The decrease began in 2008 as the financial crisis unfolded, and has not 
recovered since then. 
Figure 10. EU production (left-hand axis, in millions of tonnes) and operating rates (right-hand axis, in 
percentages), 2005-13 
 
Source: IHS (2015). 
 
3. Investment 
Investment in new capacity and in maintaining current capacity is markedly lower in the EU than in 
other regions. Two soda ash plants were closed in 2014 – one in Povoa, Portugal and the other in 
Winnington, UK, but the EU is not the only region that has recently seen soda ash plants close down. 
One Kenyan plant closed in 2014, one Japanese plant closed in 2015 and two Chinese plants were 
idled in 2015 (IHS, 2015).  
However, it is the only region where capacity is expected to decrease significantly over the 2014-18 
period. Closures in other regions are more than offset by investments in new plants. China alone is 
expected to increase its 2013 capacity by nearly a third: nearly 8 million tonnes of extra production 
capacity is expected by 2017 (IHS, 2015). 
There is no clear indication that the lack of investments in capacity throughout the EU is an 
unintended consequence of the EU ETS and potential future costs it could cause. It is more likely that 
the ongoing economic difficulties and falling domestic demand are the root cause of this trend. 
Domestic demand for soda ash has fallen by nearly 1 million tonnes on a yearly basis between 2005 
and 2014. 
4. International economic impacts 
The European Commission’s EU ETS impact assessments for the EU ETS take a wide variety of 
economic, environmental and social impacts of the EU ETS into account. However, the impacts 
beyond the EU are not analysed in detail. The first EU ETS-related impact assessment dates to 2008 
(European Commission, 2008) and does not cover international implications beyond the 
competitiveness issues for domestic industry. Additionally the 2010 impact assessment 
accompanying the Benchmarking Decision for instance does not mention any international impacts 
(European Commission, 2010b). The 2014 impact assessment on the revision of the carbon leakage 
list (European Commission, 2014a) and the 2015 impact assessment on the Structural Reform 
proposal (European Commission, 2015a) addresses direct and indirect impacts and costs, but do not 
identify that these impacts can also be international in nature.  
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Generally these impact assessments focus on domestic impacts, but stop at the EU’s borders. On the 
international level there is also a lack of procedures and governance structures that identify, 
measure, and mitigate the cross-border impacts of climate change mitigation policies. In that light, 
an estimation of the international impacts of the EU ETS is made. 
The various additional costs for soda ash producers caused by the EU ETS are likely to increase global 
prices for soda ash, which increases production cost for downstream sectors – both in developing 
and developed countries – ultimately leading to higher prices of finished goods for consumers. We 
consider the international spillover effects to be unintended impacts of the EU ETS. 
Downstream sectors – both in and outside the EU – can be impacted by the EU ETS costs that the EU 
soda ash sector potentially faces in the future. The various costs for soda ash producers caused by 
the EU ETS are likely to increase the sales price of EU soda ash. In the long run the margins in the 
market for an internationally traded commodity are minimal. EU producers will therefore either 
adapt their prices to the new costs or face closure. 
Global soda ash prices will rise as a reaction to the price increases in the EU, whether these are 
caused by EU producers increasing their sales price, or supply falling because of closures. Currently 
uncompetitive non-EU producers, notably in China, will be able to enter the market as global prices 
increase. These higher soda ash prices are passed through downstream sectors such as glass and 
detergents, leading to higher production costs further downstream, for example, in the construction 
and car industries. Downstream sectors and ultimately consumers – both in developing and 
developed countries – face increased prices due to this domino effect. Figure 11 indicates that 
although there is no perfect correlation between EU and Chinese soda ash prices, in the mid to long 
term prices show the same trend. 
Figure 11. Comparison of soda ash prices in the main producing regions, 2010-15 (US 2010=100) 
 
Source: IHS, 2015. 
 
Estimating the costs that are passed through a wide variety of downstream sectors, products and 
production processes is challenging. Therefore we present below a relatively simple example based 
on the flat glass sector.  
The increase in the production costs of flat glass in developing countries that import soda ash from 
the EU can be described as: 
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𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑖𝑛 % ) = 
 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  (𝑖𝑛 %)  
𝑥 𝐸𝑈 𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑖𝑛 % 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) 
𝑥 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ (𝑖𝑛 %)  
Where: 
- Soda ash share of flat glass production cost: soda ash is one of the most expensive raw 
materials used in the flat glass industry, and amounts to 60% of raw material costs. Raw 
materials make up approximately 22% of production costs for flat glass, meaning that 
soda ash alone accounts for more than 13% of flat glass production costs (Pilkington, 
2010). 
 
- EU ETS soda ash cost increase is the increase in the production due to theoretical EU ETS 
direct costs. For a medium emissions-intensive plant (1.15 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of 
soda ash), production costs are increased by 2% for an EUA price of €8 and by 6% for a 
EUA price of €30, as described in Table 1. 
 
- Ability to pass costs through: pass-through rates for the soda ash sector have not been 
studied previously. A recent European Commission impact assessment concluded that 
the chemicals sector as a whole is expected to be able to pass all costs onwards, on the 
basis of literature references focusing on some organic chemicals (European 
Commission, 2015a), however soda ash is an inorganic chemical. Ecorys (2008) estimated 
that the pass through of soda ash EU ETS costs to the flat glass industry amounts to €7.9 
million annually in the UK alone. 
 
However, we conservatively assume that only half of the soda ash EU ETS costs can be 
passed through; otherwise Chinese producers will step in, as operating rates are 
currently around 80% in China. The ability to pass costs through is therefore assumed to 
be 0.5. 
Using the information above, we estimate that at an EUA price of €30 a tonne, this would increase 
production costs for flat glass by approximately 0.4%. This assumes that the soda ash is produced in a 
medium emissions-intensive plant. 
A Vivid Economics report (Vivid Economics & Ecofys, 2014) analysed the pass-through ability of the 
flat glass industry and estimated that until 2020, the flat glass industry will be able to pass through 
75% of EU ETS costs that have been passed through from the soda ash sector to the flat glass 
industry, wherever the glass plant is localised. This means that flat glass prices could increase by 
approximately 0.3%.  
In these hypothetical circumstances, the EU ETS costs for the soda ash plant would be passed along 
the value chain to flat glass producers (both in the EU and outside the EU), which, in turn, pass 75% 
of their cost increase to their consumers, leading to an increase of up to 0.3% in the sales price of flat 
glass. 
If we keep in mind that EU producers export a significant share of domestic soda ash production to 
developing countries (such as Brazil, India, Egypt, Indonesia and Morocco), flat glass producers and 
consumers in developing countries could be affected, as input prices are increased by the EU ETS. 
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This example is of course not an accurate description of the current reality; for instance EUA prices 
are not at currently at €30, but it is an indication of how costs could pass through the value chain to 
third-country producers. This dynamic is expected to influence production costs in domestic 
industries that are downstream from the EU and Chinese soda ash sector. This would weaken their 
competitive position vis-à-vis producers that source their soda ash from the US or other trona-based 
producers such as the US and Turkey. 
Figures 12 and 13 show that there is currently no clear correlation between the recent evolution in 
soda ash prices in the different regions and the evolution of some important cost factors, including 
the EU ETS. It might become possible to discern some correlation between these variables, as the EU 
ETS continues to operate and EUA prices increase. 
Figure 12. Soda ash prices in the main producing 
regions, 2010-15(US 2010=100) 
Figure 13. Energy and EUA prices, 2010-15 ($) 
 
Source: IHS (2015).   Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data, ICE exchange. 
 
3.2 Social impacts of the EU ETS 
3.2.1 Positive social impacts 
Because soda ash plants in the EU are currently mainly coal-fired, the reduction in emissions that the 
EU ETS is meant to cause would have potentially positive health benefits as local air pollution is 
reduced. 
 
3.2.2 Negative social impacts 
The EU ETS impact assessments include estimations of impacts of various policy options on 
employment in the EU. For example, the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the EU 
ETS reform for phase 4 (European Commission, 2015a) estimates that the overall impact of the EU 
ETS on employment is limited. The 2030 impact assessment (European Commission, 2014b) shows 
that when the revenues of EUA auctions are recycled and if carbon pricing is extended to all sectors, 
climate change mitigation policies can lead to an increase in employment of 0.2% or 430,000 net jobs 
created in the EU by 2030. 
A detailed analysis of the employment effects of the EU ETS on the soda ash sector has not been 
conducted to date. Some 22,500 people were employed in the soda ash sector in 2002 (European 
Commission, 2007), but it is unclear how employment in this sector has evolved since then. However, 
during the previous ten years, five soda ash plants have been closed down, with significant job losses 
as a result. The three most recent closures (Povoa in Portugal, Winnington in the UK and Ocna Mures 
in Romania) affected approximately 2,600 employees.  
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It is important to note that the five aforementioned closures cannot be attributed to climate change 
policies alone. Indeed, Tata announced that the closure of the Winnington plant was caused mainly 
by energy prices (Taylor, 2013). Four out of five plants were gas-fired, and faced higher production 
costs due to higher gas prices compared to coal-fired plants. The closures are therefore due to a long 
list of factors, including energy prices and climate change policies. However, carbon pricing is just 
one factor in a wider competitiveness story. The EU ETS can therefore not be considered as having 
had unintended negative impacts on employment in the EU soda ash sector. 
3.3 Environmental impacts of the EU ETS 
3.3.1 Positive environmental impacts 
The main positive environmental impact is the reduction of GHG emissions throughout the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS. This is an obvious positive impact as the EU ETS has a stated goal to reduce 
GHG emissions in a cost effective way. 
While the emissions from sectors under the EU ETS have fallen significantly since the inception of the 
EU ETS, the share of that reduction that the EU ETS accounts for is estimated at only 21% for the 
2005-12 period. The lion’s share of emissions reductions in that period was caused by the slowdown 
of economic activity due to the economic and financial crises (Bel & Joseph, 2014).  
3.3.2 Negative environmental impacts 
Carbon leakage is frequently seen as the major unintended negative environmental impacts of 
climate change policies. Broadly speaking, carbon leakage can be defined as the displacement of 
economic activities and/or changes in investment patterns, that directly or indirectly cause GHG 
emissions to be displaced from a jurisdiction with GHG constraints, to another jurisdiction, with no or 
less GHG constraints (Marcu et al., 2013). 
There are a number of factors that may enable asymmetric carbon policies to result in carbon 
leakage. These so-called ‘carbon leakage risk factors’ determine whether climate policies increase 
the carbon leakage risk for a product or a sector on the basis of two criteria: the size of the carbon 
cost and the ability of the sector to pass through carbon costs to other sectors or consumers. 
In the EU ETS, the carbon costs that firms incur by complying with the EU ETS may undermine their 
competitive position. This could lead to demand or investment being relocated to other jurisdictions 
that have a lower or different carbon constraint. For the soda ash sector, that would mean that less 
emissions-intensive production in the EU would be replaced by more energy- and emissions-
intensive production in for example China, where significant production capacity is currently idled, 
and Turkey. The relocation of EU soda ash production to China would therefore have a significantly 
negative environmental impact.  
While the current global overcapacity in the soda ash sector points to a lack of the ability to pass 
through costs, especially if they are only incurred in one region. The European Commission impact 
assessment (European Commission, 2015a) indicates that the chemicals sector as a whole is deemed 
to have the ability pass on all costs to downstream sectors and consumers. This impact assessment, 
however, does not present any specific evidence for the soda ash sector or the ability to pass through 
costs in export markets.  
Currently there is no evidence that carbon leakage has taken place as the EU ETS is too recent to 
discern significant different trade flows and investment patterns. Additionally, the expansion of 
carbon-pricing mechanisms could deter carbon leakage from happening. In the case of soda ash, the 
aforementioned Chinese National ETS is of particular importance. It is currently unclear how 
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stringent that ETS will be, which cost alleviation tools will be used and which parts of the chemicals 
sector will be covered by it.  
3.4 Conclusions on the impacts of climate change policies 
The EU has a number of climate change mitigation policies in place. The impacts of the industrial 
emissions Directive are too indirect to be attributed to climate change mitigation, and the renewable 
energy Directive impacts the soda ash sector indirectly through the combined production of heat and 
electricity. Both are considered beyond the scope of this case study. 
The EU ETS, on the other hand, has the potential to significantly increase production costs for EU 
soda ash producers, depending on the EUA price and the emissions intensity of the individual plant. 
This is an intended impact of the EU ETS, as producers internalize the costs of GHG emission and low-
GHG innovation and production is incentivized. Because of a global overcapacity, asymmetrical 
climate change policies could, however, have big unintended impacts on production, trade and 
investment in the jurisdiction enacting more stringent climate change policies. If constrained 
producers have the ability to pass cost increases through,  costs could be passed on down the value 
chain and affect industries in third countries, including developing countries. 
At the present time, however, there is no evidence to suggest that these unintended impacts are 
happening. The EU ETS has only been in operation for a short time, and in that period, other factors 
(such as the economic and financial crises) have masked potential impacts from the EU ETS.  
Additionally, the global scope of carbon pricing is increasing, and one of the EU’s main competitors in 
the soda ash market – China – is set to introduce a national ETS next year. Depending on how that 
ETS is managed and implemented, a number of expected negative impacts of the EU ETS, such as 
carbon leakage, might be limited. 
However, other countries that have not been studied in-depth in this case study (such as Turkey and 
India) have no clear climate change policies in place that impact the soda ash sector. For the 
foreseeable future, asymmetries in climate change policies will continue to persist, as will the 
unintended competitive impacts of those asymmetries. 
4. Mitigation of impacts of climate change policies 
The unintended impacts of climate change mitigation policies need to be managed in order to enable 
the transition to a low GHG economy. Impacts can be domestic or international, and the tools to 
mitigate impacts can also be implemented at the domestic or international level. 
4.1 Domestic mitigation tools 
In the same way that the EU ETS was at the heart of the chapter on impacts of climate change 
mitigation policies, it is also at the centre of this chapter, which covers the mitigation and 
management of those impacts. The main EU tool to mitigate the economic and environmental 
impacts is the free allocation to limit the risks of carbon leakage. 
4.1.1 Mitigation of EU ETS economic and environmental impacts 
There are several cost mitigation measures in place in the EU ETS to address costs faced by industrial 
producers in the EU. The most important one (the Carbon Leakage List) is analysed in depth. Other 
cost mitigation measures are briefly discussed.  
A. Carbon Leakage List 
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There are a number of factors that may enable asymmetric carbon policies to result in carbon 
leakage. These so-called ‘carbon leakage risk factors’ determine whether climate policies increase 
the carbon leakage risk for a product or a sector on the basis of two criteria: the size of the carbon 
cost and the ability of the sector to pass through carbon costs to other sectors or consumers. 
Sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are on the Carbon Leakage List, and receive free allowances 
at 100% of their benchmarks. Free allocation through the Carbon Leakage List acts to reduce some of 
the intended impacts of the EU ETS (direct costs), thereby reducing the risk of unintended impacts 
(production shifts, plant closures etc) materializing.If an activity fulfils any of the following three 
thresholds, they are added to the leakage list: 
a) Direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 5% of gross value added and 
trade intensity (calculated as the value of imports plus exports over annual turnover plus 
imports) is over 10%, 
b) Direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 30% or 
c) Trade intensity is over 30%.  
There is significant ongoing debate on whether carbon leakage protection has been overly generous 
as nearly all manufacturing sectors are on the list. Currently the Carbon Leakage List covers 
approximately 95% of total industrial emissions in the EU ETS (De Bruyn et al., 2013), although the 
rules are set to change from 2021 onwards; but this case study focuses on the current rules. 
Allocation to sectors on the list is largely determined by the product benchmarks, established in the 
Benchmarking Decision. The benchmarks are determined as the number of allowances received per 
tonne of production at the installation. However, the level of production at an installation is based on 
historical levels: the median production during the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2008, 
or, where it is higher, on the median production during the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 
December 2010. For the soda ash sector, this benchmark was set at 0.843 tonnes of CO2e per tonne 
of soda ash. Installations that are more emissions-intensive are motivated to catch up to their best-
performing peers.  
The soda ash sector is on Carbon Leakage List. Free allocation is made according to the following 
formula: 
Allocation = benchmark x historical activity level x carbon leakage exposure factor x cross-sectoral 
correction factor 
Where the historical activity level (=production) is installation specific, and the carbon leakage factor 
is 1 for the soda ash sector. The cross-sectoral correction factor guarantees that the sum of the free 
allocation proposed by each member state does not exceed the EU ETS-wide cap on free allocation. 
The cross-sectoral correction factor determines the proportion of the proposed free allocation that is 
granted to each installation that is eligible to receive allocation and will decrease yearly to reach circa 
82,44% in 2020. 
Changes in production are currently not taken into account, unless production is scaled back to less 
than 50% of the historical level (when free allocation is stopped). Production increases beyond 
historical levels (and thus emissions increases) also fall outside the scope of the benchmark and 
therefore are not taken into account during free allocation of allowances. Expansion of production 
beyond historical levels therefore causes direct EU ETS costs, even for installations that are more 
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efficient than the benchmark. However, plants that increase capacity can apply for increases in 
allocation to adjust their free allocation to the new plant capacity. 
To establish the effectiveness of this tool, we analyse the potential direct EU ETS costs with and 
without carbon leakage-linked free allocation (see Table 2). We assume zero free allocation to 
manufacturing sectors that are not on the list, which does not take the carbon leakage exposure 
factor for sectors not on the carbon leakage list into account. All manufacturing sectors currently 
receive free allowances.  
Table 2. Total additional costs with and without free allocation at benchmark level, for plants with different 
emissions intensities for two EUA prices, and with estimated percentages of current cash costs 
(approx. €150/tonne of soda ash) 
Carbon price Carbon cost for low 
emissions-intensive plant 
(0.8 tonne of CO2 per 
tonne of soda ash) 
Carbon cost for medium 
emissions-intensive 
plant (1.15 tonnes of CO2 
per tonne of soda ash) 
Carbon cost for high 
emissions-intensive 
plant (1.4 tonnes of CO2 
per tonne of soda ash) 
With free allocation at benchmark level (0.843 EUAs per tonne of soda ash) 
€8 per EUA (or 1 
tonne of CO2) 
€-0.24 
Approx. 0.2% of 
production costs 
€2.56 
Approx. 2% of 
production costs 
€4.56 
Approx. 3% of 
production costs 
€30 per EUA (or 
1 tonne of CO2) 
€-1.19 
Approx. 1% of 
production costs 
€9.31 
Approx. 6% of 
production costs 
€16.81 
Approx. 11% of 
production costs 
Without free allocation at benchmark level 
€8 per EUA (or 1 
tonne of CO2) 
€6.5 
Approx. 4% of  
production costs 
€9.3 
Approx. 6% of 
production costs  
€11.3 
Approx. 8% of   
production costs 
€30 per EUA (or 
1 tonne of CO2) 
€24.1 
Approx. 16% of  
production costs 
€34.6 
Approx. 23% of 
production costs 
€42.1 
Approx. 28% of 
production costs 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Comparing the situations with and without free allocation shows that, as expected, the EU ETS direct 
costs per tonne are significantly higher without free allocation. With a EUA price of €8 per tonne, 
production costs are €6.7 higher for each type of plant. With a EUA price of €30 per tonne, 
production costs are €25.3 higher. It is also clear that all plants are witnessing a significant increase in 
production costs; from 4% (in the best circumstances) to 28% (in the worst circumstances) without 
free allocation. The direct cost of the EU ETS is reduced by more than 60% for high emission intensive 
soda ash plants.  
However, in the real world the soda ash sector has received significant free allocation. The lack of 
flexibility in the supply of free allocation, which is based on historical activity levels, has shielded the 
soda ash sector from direct EU ETS costs. In the longer term we cannot expect this effect to continue 
as demand picks up. Also, the expectation is that free allocation will not remain at current levels ad 
infinitum. The total amount of free allocation decreases every year: in 2015 it is set to be 1.79% 
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lower than in 2014 (European Commission, 2013) through the continued impact of the cross-sectoral 
correction factor, which cuts free allocation to all installations based on a pre-determined factor 
derived from the decreasing overall cap in the ETS. This will lead to increased upwards pressure on 
direct costs in the long term. 
B. Other cost mitigation measures 
Besides the Carbon Leakage List, there are two main tools that are or have been used in the EU: a) 
international offsets and b) state aid to compensate indirect costs for electricity-intensive industries.  
International offsets can be surrendered instead of EUAs, and are in general far cheaper. However 
their use has been subjected to conditions starting in 2013, and from 2020 onwards they will no 
longer be accepted. However, international offsets have not been surrendered by any of the EU soda 
ash plants, most likely because soda ash entered the EU ETS as conditions for the use international 
offsets were being implemented.   
State aid to compensate indirect costs for electricity-intensive industries can be given by EU member 
states after they receive approval for their state aid scheme from the European Commission. This 
state aid aims to compensate electricity-intensive industries (such as the aluminium sector) for the 
indirect costs that have been passed through to them by power producers. In this manner it reduces 
the intended indirect costs for industries in order to reduce the risk for unintended impacts. Details 
on sums granted to specific plants and industries is not public, but it is safe to assume that this 
scheme is not of particular relevance for the soda ash sector as it is not an electricity-intensive 
sector. 
C. Conclusion 
Free allocation through the Carbon Leakage List in the EU ETS is the main cost-mitigating measure, 
and strongly mitigates the direct costs for the soda ash sector, thereby reducing the risk of 
unintended impacts materializing, such as employment losses and changes in production and trade 
trends. This reduction of direct costs also means that lower indirect costs are passed on to 
downstream sectors, further mitigating downstream impacts of the EU ETS that were discussed 
under chapter 3. 
4.1.2 Mitigation of EU ETS social impacts  
Social impacts – most notably job losses – that the EU ETS might cause are not dealt with at the EU 
ETS or indeed the EU level. There is no international safety net in place to mitigate the unintended 
social impacts of the EU ETS. 
EU member states have social security and safety nets in place. Owners of plants that are being 
closed are frequently involved in the implementation and operation of mitigation measures. In case 
of large job losses (for example, because of the closure of a major car factory), they can receive 
support from governments to help mitigate the effects on workers (Belga, 2013).  
Mitigation measures can include retraining programmes, early retirement, unemployment benefits 
and support programmes to help switch to other jobs, as illustrated by the recent closure of two 
soda ash plants. The 2014 closure of the Povoa plant in Portugal affected 450 workers, and the 
operator (Solvay) sought to mitigate the impacts by helping employees to relocate to fill job openings 
in other Solvay facilities throughout Europe (Solvay, 2013). The Winnington plant in the UK was also 
closed in 2014, and the number of compulsory redundancies was limited to 75 (out of a total of 220 
 30 
employees) through redeployment and voluntary redundancies. Tata Chemicals Europe, the operator 
of the plant, provided packages and outplacement programmes (Taylor, 2013). 
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4.2 International cooperative approaches 
Tools to measure and mitigate the international impacts of climate change policies and projects are 
currently lacking. 
At the UNFCCC level, there is a commitment by Parties to consider the adverse impacts of climate 
change policies and projects (also known as ‘response measures’), especially for developing 
countries. The Kyoto Protocol includes a promise to strive to minimise the adverse economic, social 
and environmental impacts of climate change mitigation policies on other Parties, especially 
developing countries. However, there has been significant debate on how to implement this. 
In response to the lack of information on response measures, a forum to discuss response measures 
was established at COP17 in Durban. This forum is a joint agenda programme of both the subsidiary 
bodies, and has the specific goal of improving the understanding of the negative impacts of climate 
change mitigation policies and projects. However, the progress achieved through this forum has been 
limited. Currently there is a discussion ongoing on the continuation of the forum. While Parties have 
expressed support for the continuation, the forum is currently in a grey zone. Progress on this topic is 
expected during COP21 in Paris. 
4.3 Conclusion on mitigation of impacts 
The lack of clear economic impacts up to now can be, at least partially, attributed to the 
effectiveness of free allocation linked to the Carbon Leakage List. As a mitigation measure it has been 
effective at shielding the domestic soda ash sector from direct EU ETS costs, and therefore limits the 
risk of unintended impacts materializing and reduces the cost that is passed through to downstream 
sectors, both in the EU and third countries. Its effectiveness may change as the cross-sectoral 
correction factor continues to decrease over time. 
However, it may also be that the inclusion of the soda ash sector in the EU ETS is too recent to 
discern strong unintended impacts that have not been mitigated. Energy prices are currently the 
most important raw material cost, but that could change if EUA prices increase to levels closer to €30 
per EUA (as expected in EU impact assessments (European Commission, 2010b). 
Additional climate-related costs could be borne by the EU soda ash sector, if international 
competitors face similar costs.  
One of the main issue that this case study identifies is the lack of clear and public data to identify, 
measure and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change policies, both domestically and 
internationally.  
While the EU does carry out impact assessments up-front, there are no follow-up exercises that 
check whether the expected impacts actually materialised, and whether there were any unexpected 
impacts. There is also a lack of tested methodologies to identify impacts and mitigation measures, 
especially beyond the implementing jurisdiction, for instance in developing countries. 
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5. Conclusion 
Currently there are significant asymmetrical climate change policies implemented for the global soda 
ash sector. EU producers face significant climate change measures, Chinese producers may from 
2017 onwards, but no climate change measures are in the pipeline for US producers. This changes 
the competitive landscape.  The impacts of climate change mitigation policies constitute only one of 
many factors affecting competitiveness: regional differences in the cost of energy and raw materials 
are far more important. 
The EU ETS has both intended and unintended, positive and negative impacts. These impacts are not 
only on emissions (their intended target area), but also in other facets of public policy – economic, 
social and environmental.  
On the positive side, the EU ETS incentivizes continued low-GHG innovation, which could be a boon 
to the EU soda ash sector if carbon pricing policies continue to spread globally. 
On the economic side the impact of the EU ETS is currently low. The most GHG efficient producers 
are far less impacted than their less carbon efficient peers, and can even benefit from the EU ETS. 
The impacts have been significantly mitigated by the main mitigation measure: free allocation. 
There are also potential unintended impacts, difficult to quantify, for soda ash users in third 
countries: EU ETS costs could be passed through to them through increases in the price of soda ash 
internationally. This has the potential to impact the cost of glass, and some consumer products, in 
developing countries. While these international impacts are difficult to quantify, given the level of EU 
allowance prices, it is unlikely that they have had a significant impact at this stage. 
The EU ETS’ unintended impacts on trade, investment and production trends, cannot currently be 
segregated. Macroeconomic events, such as the economic and financial crises are deemed to have 
had a far greater impact. The impacts on employment have, so far, been limited. The past decade a 
number of soda ash plants in the EU have closed down, but energy prices are deemed a far greater 
factor in this than EU ETS costs. 
However, the cost that emerge from the EU ETS have the potential to become substantial for soda 
ash producers, and the chain that includes users of soda ash in jurisdictions outside the EU, including 
developing countries. Three main factors will determine the EU ETS costs for the soda ash sector in 
the future: 1) the choice of fuel to generate heat 2) the evolution of the price of EUAs and 3) the 
continued reduction in freely allocated EUAs, which is the most important flanking measure to 
accompany carbon pricing. 
While the domestic social impacts of the EU ETS can be addressed through safety nets and flanking 
measures (such as retraining schemes) that exist in the EU’s Member States, there is a lack of 
recognition and management of potential international impacts. The international impacts of the EU 
ETS are currently not the focus of policy makers, and are therefore not identified or measured in a 
systematic manner. Ultimately it is impossible to manage the negative unintended impacts of 
climate-related policies if those impacts are not known. 
Beyond the lessons learned specific to the soda ash case, the analysis here supports the notion that 
any climate change policies should be carefully assessed for their broader sustainable development 
impacts, domestically and internationally, both in their initial elaboration, as well as on an on-going 
basis. 
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